Part Five Philosophy of Culture
第五部分 文化哲学
Eleven Philosophy of History
第十一章 历史哲学
HEGEL AND HISTORICISM
黑格尔与历史主义
In his 1830 Encyclopedia, the mature exposition of his system, Hegel gave perfunctory treatment to world history, assigning it only five paragraphs (§§548–52), the longest of which was really a discussion about the relationship of church to state (§552). A reader might infer from this that history was not that important for Hegel. But here, as always, it would be naive to equate the importance of a topic with the length of its treatment. Though Hegel gave it short shrift in the Encyclopedia, history played a crucial role in his philosophy. For the characteristic theme of his philosophy is spirit (pp. 110–12), whose chief domain is history. The distinguishing feature of spirit over life, Hegel maintains, consists in freedom; but freedom realizes itself only in history.
在他1830年的《哲学百科全书》（他的体系那圆熟慎重的阐述）中，黑格尔对于世界历史的处理却有些敷衍了事，仅仅给它分配了五个段落（第548-52节），其中最长的段落实际上是讨论国家与教会的关系的（第552节）。读者可能会从这一点中推断说，历史对于黑格尔来说并没有那么重要。但是在这里，这些人一如既往地把论题的重要性和处理问题的篇幅等同起来，实在是天真无知。尽管黑格尔在《哲学百科全书》中只给了历史五小节的篇幅，但是历史在他的哲学中的地位举足轻重。因为他的哲学最具特色的主题是精神（第110-112页），而精神最重要的领域是历史。黑格尔强调说，凌驾于生活之上的精神，其与众不同的特征就是自由；但是自由只有在历史中才实现自身。
So important was the philosophy of history for Hegel that he lectured on the subject five times in Berlin. We now know his philosophy of history almost entirely from a few fragments and student lecture notes. Because they are readable, these lectures have been the most popular introduction to his philosophy. The popularity of these lectures, and Hegel’s influence in the 1820s, helped to spread his reputation as the philosopher of historicism. Some scholars have even seen historicism as Hegel’s central contribution to philosophy. Supposedly, it was Hegel who first historicized reason, and who introduced the idea of development into philosophy itself.1
历史哲学对于黑格尔来说是如此之重要，以至于他在柏林期间曾经五次讲授这个主题。我们现在几乎完全是从他的一些残篇和学生的听课笔记中认识他的历史哲学的。这些讲座因为清通可读，现在成了他的哲学中最流行的导论。这些讲座的广泛流传，以及黑格尔在19世纪20年代如日中天的声望，在他作为一个历史主义的哲学家的名声传播上与有力焉。某些学者甚至把历史主义看作是黑格尔对于哲学的主要贡献。极有可能是由黑格尔第一次把理性历史化了，他把发展的观念引入到历史自身之中。
Hegel’s reputation as the philosopher of historicism demands careful reassessment. Much here depends on the precise meaning given to ‘historicism’, a very vague and ambiguous term. We have already defined the original and general sense of the term (pp. 29–31): the doctrine that everything in the human world has a history, that society has an organic structure, and that all human beliefs and practices derive of necessity from their specific historical context. In its original form, historicism did not have the meaning that has often been later associated with it: the thesis that historical development is inevitable and progressive. Wary of generalizations about society and history as a whole, Montesquieu, Hamann and Möser, the fathers of historicism, always insisted upon the individuality and uniqueness of historical context, so that it was impossible to determine a single measure of progress for all cultures. Already in the late eighteenth century, however, there were clear traces of this later historicist doctrine. Lessing, Kant, Schelling, Herder and Schlegel maintained that there are laws of history, and that there is progress in its development. Schelling, Herder and Schlegel extended the organic analogy to history, so that each culture had its own birth, childhood, maturity and decline.
黑格尔作为一个历史主义哲学家的名声需要审慎地评估。在这里，在很大程度上依赖于其赋予了“历史主义”这个含糊不清和模棱两可的词以一种精确意义。我们已经定义了这个术语的原初的和普泛的意义（第29-31页）：它是这样一种学说，在人类世界中的所有事物都有历史，社会有一个有机结构，所有的人类信念和实践都必然地源自它们具体的历史语境。在它原本的形式中，历史主义并没有后来经常与之联系在一起的意义：“历史的发展是不可避免的并不断进步的”这个论题。由于担心把社会与历史普遍化为一个整体，孟德斯鸠、哈曼和莫塞尔，历史主义之父，总是坚持历史语境的个体性与独一无二性，以致于不可能为所有文化规定一个单一的进步尺度。然而，早在十八世纪晚期，已经存在这种后来的历史主义学说的清晰踪迹。莱辛、康德、谢林、施莱格尔等人强调，存在着历史的规律，而在历史发展中也存在着进步。谢林、赫尔德把有机的类比推扩到历史，因此每一种文化都有其诞生、童年、成熟与衰亡的历程。
If historicism is understood in both the above senses, then Hegel was indeed an historicist. He not only subscribes to the general doctrine, but also advances the thesis that history is progressive. We cannot say that Hegel was the founder of historicism in these senses, because the doctrine had such a long history before him; but we can say that, due to his influence, he was a central propagator or transmitter. Hence, if only in this modest sense, Hegel’s reputation as an historicist is deserved.
如果历史主义是在上述两种意义上得到理解的，那么，黑格尔的确是一个历史主义者。他不仅同意这种学说，还提出了“历史是不断发展的”这个论题。我们不能在这个意义上说黑格尔是历史主义的创立者，因为这种学说在他之前就有一段漫长的历程；但是我们可以说，由于它的影响力，他成了历史主义的一位举足轻重的传播者或者宣传者。因此，如果仅仅从这个意义上来说，黑格尔作为一位历史主义者的名声是名至实归的。
There is, however, another meaning to the term ‘historicism’ in this period, one in which it denotes a very specific moral and legal doctrine. According to this doctrine, there are no universal moral laws or legal codes, because the only rationale for morals and laws must be within their specific historical and cultural context. Such a relativistic doctrine seemed to be the inevitable result of historicism in the general sense: if all laws are the product of a specific social and historical context, they are inseparable from it and adapted to it; hence they have no validity beyond it. If we universalize these laws, as if they held for all mankind, we are guilty of ethnocentrism, the fallacy of judging all cultures by the standards of our own. This moral and legal doctrine was developed by Möser, Hamann and Herder, who used it to undermine the rationalism of the Enlightenment. It eventually blossomed into the historical school of law of the early nineteenth century, whose main proponents were F.K. Savigny and K.F. Eichhorn.
然而，“历史主义”这个词在这个阶段还有另外一种意义，在这种意义中，它意味着一种具体的道德的和法律的学说。依据这种学说，并不存在普遍的道德法则或者法典，因为道德与法律唯一的基本原理必定存在于具体的历史与文化语境之中。这样一种相对主义的学说，似乎是在普遍意义上的历史主义不可避免的后果：如果所有的法律都是具体教会和历史语境的产物，那么它们就与那种语境不可分离，并且适名于它；因此，它们就没有在它之外的有效性。如果我们把这些法律普遍化，就好像它们可以适合所有的人类，那么我们就犯有种族中心的罪过，依据我们自己的标准来判定所有文化的过错。这种道德与法律学说是由莫塞尔、哈曼和赫尔德发展出来的，他们用它来削弱启蒙运动的理性主义的基础。它最终在十九世纪早期的历史主义法律学派中达到顶峰，这个学派的主要支持者是F. K.萨维尼和艾希何恩（K. F. Eichhorn）。
It is important to see that, in this sense, Hegel was not an historicist, and that he was indeed a central figure in the reaction against it. It was one of the central aims of Hegel’s philosophy to uphold the authority of reason against the relativism of historicism. Hence his epistemology would attempt to restore rational criticism, and his philosophy of right would re-attempt to re-establish natural law, in the face of historicism. What makes Hegel’s reputation as the historicist par excellence so misleading is that the central thesis of his philosophy of history – that there is reason in history – was partly a reaction against emerging historicism.
重要的是看到，在这种意义上，黑格尔不是一个历史主义者，事实上他是反对这个学派的中坚人物。黑格尔哲学的一个核心目标是支持理性的权威，以反对历史主义的相对主义。因此，他的认识论想方设法要恢复理性的批判，而他的法哲学则是面临历史主义时再次尝试自然法的重新建构。尤其使黑格尔作为历史主义者的名声如此误导人的是，历史哲学的核心论题“历史中存在着理性”，在一定程度上反作用于暂露头角的历史主义。
In sum, Hegel’s role in the development of historicism was ambivalent. He was both its defender and critic: a defender of the doctrines that all human activities are the product of history and that history conforms to laws; but a critic of its relativism, its attempt to undermine the universal authority of reason. In this ambivalence we can again discern Hegel’s attempt to preserve and reform the legacy of the Enlightenment.
总而言之，黑格尔在历史主义发展进程中的作用是模棱两可的，他既是它的捍卫者，又是它的批评者：他捍卫的学说是，所有的人类活动都是历史的产物，而历史遵从着某些法则；但是他又是历史主义的相对主义的批评者，因为历史主义试图削弱理性的普遍权威。在这种模棱两可中，我们能够再次察觉到黑格尔保存并改造启蒙运动遗产的努力。
REASON IN HISTORY
历史中的理性
In the introduction to his lectures on the philosophy of world history Hegel states that the fundamental idea that philosophy brings to history is that of reason, and more specifically the idea that ‘reason governs the world, and that world history is therefore a rational process’ (VG 28/27). This thesis follows straightforwardly from his absolute idealism, according to which everything is an appearance of the absolute idea. The philosophy of history is essentially the application of absolute idealism to history itself. This basic point is the stumbling-block to all those who wish to separate Hegel’s social and political philosophy from his metaphysics.
在世界历史哲学讲座的导言中，黑格尔声明，哲学带入历史之中的基本理念是理性的理念，更加具体地说，即“理性统治世界，因此世界历史是一个理性的过程”（VG28/27）的理念。这个论题可以直截了当地从他的绝对观念论中推导而出，依据绝对唯心论，所有事物都是绝对理念的显现。历史哲学本质上是把绝对唯心论应用到历史自身之中。对于所有想要把黑格尔的社会与政治哲学同他的形而上学分离开来的人来说，这个基本的观点都是一个绊脚石。
What, more precisely, does Hegel mean by reason in history? On the most basic level he means that history conforms to laws, or that everything within it acts according to necessity. Hence Hegel identifies the form of reason with necessity (EPW §§1, 9); and he opposes his thesis that reason governs history with the Epicurean tradition, according to which everything happens by chance (VG 37/34).
到底什么是黑格尔的历史中的理性的确切含义？在最基本的水平上，他的意思是，历史遵从各种规律，或者历史中的一切事物都依据必然性而行动。因此，黑格尔把理性的形式等同于必然性（EPW，第1节，第9节）；他把他“理性统治历史”的论题和伊壁鸠鲁的传统理论对立起来，依照这个传统理论，所有事物都是由于机运而偶然发生的（VG, 37/34页）。
Of course, Hegel’s thesis means more than just that history is governed by laws. For Hegel has in mind a specific kind of laws. These laws are not only mechanical, explaining events by their immediate context, but also teleological, accounting for them by their purpose or end. To say that there there is reason in history therefore means for Hegel that events conform to some purpose or design, or that they happen of necessity to realize a purpose (VG 50/44). Thus Hegel stresses that the philosopher of history must not rest content with external necessity, ‘a necessity that originates in causes that are themselves no more than external circumstances’ (VG 29/28), and that he should strive to explain the internal necessity of things, why they happen from their underlying purpose or inherent form.
当然，黑格尔的论题所意味着的东西远远多于“历史被诸种规律所统治”。因为黑格尔牢记在心的是一种特定类型的规律。这些规律不仅仅是机械的，通过它们的直接语境来解释事件，而且也是目的论的，通过它们的目标或目的来解说它们。因此，说历史中存在着理性，对于黑格尔意味着，事件遵从着某种目标或者设计，或者它们出于必然性而实现一个目标（VG50/44页）。因此，黑格尔强调说，历史哲学家绝对不能满足于外部的必然性，“这种必然性起源于它们自身，而不是外部的环境的原因当中”（VG29/28页），而他应当力争解释事物的内部必然性，它们为什么从它们的奠基性的目标或者固有形式中产生。
In his Logic Hegel has a very specific account of mechanical and teleological explanation, which is important for his philosophy of history. Mechanical explanation makes the reasons for events prior causes in time; it is hypothetical or conditional: if one earlier event occurs another later event must also occur. Teleological explanation, however, assumes that the reason for an event is some purpose, which is not prior in time. Like Aristotle, Hegel identifies the purpose with the inherent form or essence of the thing, its ‘formal– final cause’. He too stresses that this formal–final cause is first only in order of explanation, not order of existence; and that it is realized, or comes into existence, only through the activity of particular agents:
在他的《逻辑学》中，黑格尔关于机械的和目的论的解释有一个非常具体的论述。此论述对于他的历史哲学非常重要。机械的解释使得事件的理性成为时间中在先的原因；这是假设的或者有条件的：如果一个更早的事件发生了，另一个较晚的事件必定也会发生。然而，目的论的解释假定说，一个事件的理性是某个目标，它不是时间中在先的。和亚里士多德一样，黑格尔把目标等同于事物的固有形式或者本质——它的“形式—目的因”。他也强调，这种形式—目的因只是在解释的次序上，而不是在存在的次序上是第一位的；只有通过特定行动者的活动，它才会实现，或者进入存在：
The first thing that we must observe is this: that what we have called a principle, final end, or vocation, or what is spirit in itself, its nature or concept, – is only something universal or abstract. A principle, so too a fundamental proposition or law, is something universal or inner, that as such, however true in itself, is still not completely actualized . . . For its actuality another moment has to be added, and this is the enactment, actualization, whose principle is the will, the activity of men in the world. It is only through this activity that those concepts, implicit determinations, are actualized. (VG 81/69–70)
我们必须观察的第一件事情是这一件：我们称之为原则、最终目的，或者天职的东西，或者在自身中是精神的东西、它的本性、或者概念——只是某种普遍性的或者抽象性的东西。一个原则，因此，一个基本的命题或者规律，是某种普遍的东西或者内部的东西。那个东西自身，无论在自身之中多么真实，仍然不是完全实现了的。……对于它的规定性而言，另一个环节必须添加进来，而这就是颁布，现实化，它的原则就是它的意志，世界中的人的活动。只有通过这种活动，这些概念，隐含的规定性，才会实现。（VG81/69-70）
In stressing the importance of teleological explanation in history, Hegel does not mean to exclude mechanical explanation. He thinks that mechanical explanation is perfectly valid of all parts within a whole; but it is inadequate from the standpoint of the whole itself. When we consider the standpoint of the whole we must take into account its purpose or design. We require teleological explanation, Hegel thinks, to explain why all the parts are present in the first place. The workings of mechanical causality are simply the means or instruments by which the purposes of history are realized.
在强调历史中目的论解释的重要性之时，黑格尔并不是说要排除机械的解释。他认为，机械的解释对一个整体中的所有部分而言是十分有效的；但是，从整体自身的立场来看，它是不充分的。如果我们考察整体的立场，我们必须把它的目标或者设计考虑在内。黑格尔认为，我们需要目的论的解释，以解释为什么最初所有的部分都是在场的。机械因果性的机制只是历史的目标借助被实现的手段或者工具。
When Hegel claims that history conforms to teleological laws he means, on the most basic level, that it follows the same laws of organic development as nature itself. He treats the objects of history – nations, cultures, and states – as organisms, which are subject to the same process of organic growth as anything in nature. ‘The national spirit is a natural individual; as such it blossoms, grows strong, fades away and dies’ (VG 67/58). Like any organism, historical development is dialectical, consisting in three movements: inchoate unity, differentiation, and reintegration or unity-indifference.
当黑格尔宣称，历史遵从目的论的规律时，他的意思是说，在最基本的水平上，它遵从与自然自身同样的有机发展的规律。他把历史的对象——民族、文化和国家——当作有机体来对待，它们都与自然中的所有东西一样，服从于同样的有机生长的过程。国家的精神是一个自然的个体；因此，它开花，健壮，逐渐凋谢，然后死亡。（VG67/58）像任何有机体一样，历史的发展是辨证的，包含着三个运动：最初的统一性、分化（差异化）、再次统一或者差异中的统一。
Hegel is careful to add, however, that history conforms to not only organic laws but also more specific laws distinctive of spirit alone. It is because history involves laws of spiritual development, Hegel maintains, that it is possible to speak of progress in history, of something higher than the cyclical development characteristic of life itself (VG 70, 149–55/61, 124–31). Since spirit is not only life but the self-awareness of life, the laws of history must concern the development of its self-awareness. These laws involve the dialectic of externalization and reinternalization, of self-loss and selfdiscovery, by which the self becomes aware of itself as a rational being (pp. 114–15).
然而，黑格尔小心翼翼地附加说，历史不仅遵从有机的规律，而且符合更加具体的精神的规律。黑格尔认为，正是因为历史涉及精神发展的规律，所以才有可能谈论历史中的进步，谈论某种对于作为生活基本特征的圆圈式发展来说更高的东西（VG 70页，149-55页/61页，124-31页）。因为精神不仅仅是生活，而且是对生活的自我觉察，所以历史的规律必定与它的自我觉察的发展相关。这些规律涉及外在化和重新内在化的辩证法，丧失和自我发现的辩证法，自我正是借助这种辩证法而觉察到它自身是一个理性的存在者（第114-5页）。
Since the laws of history concern self-awareness of spirit, and since the distinguishing characteristic of spirit is freedom, the laws of history concern the self-awareness of freedom. Such selfawareness is indeed the purpose or end of history itself (VG 63/54). It is in terms of this goal that Hegel measures progress. He divides world history into three major epochs, which are specific stages in the development of the self-awareness of freedom. There is the Oriental epoch, which understands that only one person is free, the ruler or despot; the Greek epoch, which holds that some persons (citizens) are free; and the Germanic epoch, which knows that all persons, or humanity as such, are free. As simplistic as this schema appears, it was obligatory for Hegel, who held that one, some and all were the three categories of quantity. Since history is governed by reason, it must exhibit all three categories.
因为历史的规律与精神的自我觉察相关，因为精神与众不同的特征就是自由，所以历史的规律与对于自由的自我觉察相关。事实上，这种自我觉察就是历史自身的目标或者目的（VG, 63/54）。黑格尔正是依据这个目标测量历史的进步。他把世界历史划分为三个主要的阶段，它们是在对于自由的自我觉察的发展过程中的具体阶段。其中，有东方的时期，它理解到只有一个人是自由的，他就是统治者或者专制君主；有希腊的时期，它认为，有些人（公民）是自由的；有日耳曼时期，它认识到，所有的人，或者说人性本身，是自由的。虽然这个图式有些简单化，对黑格尔而言，它带有某种强制性。黑格尔认为，独一、有些和一切是三个量的范畴。因为历史是由理性统治着，所以它必须展示所有这三个范畴。
It is important to see that there is a double meaning to Hegel’s phrase ‘reason in history’. The phrase refers to not only the form of history – that it conforms to laws or ends – but also its content – the specific purpose of history. Since the self-awareness of freedom is the goal of history, and since freedom is the distinguishing characteristic of rationality, the goal of history is also the self-awareness of reason itself. Hence history is governed by reason both in that it has a purpose and in what this purpose is. To say that there is reason in history means both that it conforms to some purpose or design, and that the purpose or design is the self-realization of reason.
重要的是看到，在黑格尔的“历史中的理性”这个词组中包含着双重意义。这个词组不仅指“历史的形式”——它遵从某些规律或目的，它还指历史的内容——历史的具体目标。因为对于自由的自我觉察是历史的目标，也因为自由是理性的独特的特征，所以，历史的目标也就是理性自身的自我觉察。因此，历史之被理性统治着，既因为它有一个目标，也就在它的目标之所是之中。说在历史中存在着理性，既意味着，历史遵从某种目标或者设计，也意味着，目标或者设计是理性的自我实现。
THE CUNNING OF REASON
理性的狡计
As stated so far, Hegel’s grand theme of reason in history seems vulnerable to two objections. First, it seems to assume, naively and implausibly, that people act from ideals or principles, as if their explicit and self-conscious aim were to realize freedom. Second, it does not give any place to freedom, for if everything happens of necessity, what choice do we have? Although Hegel thinks that the end of history is the self-awareness of freedom, he also stresses that history conforms to laws, so that the realization of this end is necessary. But a freedom that is realized of necessity seems to be no freedom at all.
如上所述，“历史中的理性”这个黑格尔的宏大主题似乎容易受到两个异议的攻击。首先它似乎天真幼稚又不合情理地假定，人是依照观念或者原则而行动的，就好像他们那明确而自我意识的目标可以实现自由。其次，它没有给予自由任何空间，因为如果所有的事情都出自必然发生，那么我们可以做什么选择？尽管黑格尔认为，历史的目的是自由的自我觉察，他也强调，历史遵从诸种规律，因此这种目的的实现就是必然性。但是自由似乎根本就不是自由。
Of course, Hegel was aware of these problems, and his response to them is one of the most provocative and controversial ideas of his philosophy of history: the cunning of reason (List der Vernunft). Stated most simply, the cunning of reason means that reason uses the self-interests of individuals to realize its ends (VG 84–8, 105/ 71–4, 89). Even if there is no coordinated and collective action among individuals, and even if they do not intentionally or selfconsciously formulate these ends to themselves, they still realize them subconsciously in pursuing their private interests. So, from the chaos of private interests, the order and common ends of reason still emerge.
当然，黑格尔觉察到了这些疑难，而他对这些疑难的回应是他的历史哲学中最具有启发也最众说纷纭的观念之一：理性的狡计（List der Vernunft）。简而言之，“理性的狡计”的意思是，理性用个体的自我利益来实现它的目的（VG 84-8，105/71-4，89）。即使每个个体之间不存在相互协调的集体性行动，即使他们并没有有意图地或有意识地对他们自身形成这些目的，他们在追逐他们的私人利益之时仍然下意识地在实现它们。因此，从私人利益的混沌之中，仍然会形成理性的秩序和共同体目的。
Such a thesis seems to resolve both difficulties. First, it does not assume that people act from moral principle; for, even if they follow their self-interest, they still realize the ends of reason. Second, although a person acts from necessity for the sake of reason, he or she does so by following self-interest; hence it is not some higher fate acting outside him or her that compels the person to do what he or she does not want or prevents him or her doing what they do want.
这样一个主题似乎解决了这两种困难。首先，它没有假定，人们是出于道德原则而行动；因为，甚至他们在遵从他们的自我利益之时，他们仍然在实现理性的目的。其次，尽管一个人为了理性起见而出于必然性行动，他或她在这样做时也是遵从自我利益。因此，强迫一个人做他（她）不想要做的事情，或者阻止他（她）做其想要做的事情的，就不是在个体之外的某种更高层次的命运。
It is one of the great ironies of Hegel’s philosophy of history that, though it makes ideals the governing powers of history, it is really not idealistic at all. For the cunning of reason means that the chief motives of human action – and the primary instruments for the realization of reason – are self-interest rather than moral principle. Hegel is indeed explicit that moral idealism should play no role in the realization of reason in history. He flatly declares: ‘. . . there is no room in living reality for empty notions like that of pursuing goodness for its own sake.’ (VG 94/80). He also warns against measuring historical necessity against our ideals of right and wrong, because this only leads to discontentment (VG 107–8/91). More fundamentally, he states that world history works on a higher plane than morality:
黑格尔历史哲学中一个最大的反讽是，尽管它使得观念变成了统治历史的力量，但是实际上它根本上不是观念论的。因为理性的狡计意味着，人的行动的动机——和实现理性的主要工具——是自我利益，而非道德原则。事实上，黑格尔非常明确，在理性在历史中实现的过程中，道德观念论不应该扮演任何角色。他断言，“在活生生的实在中，没有给诸如，为了自身之故而追逐善，等空洞的观念留下任何空间”（VG第94页／第80页）。他还警告不要用我们关于对与错的观念来测度历史，因为这只会导致不满（VG第107-8页／第91页）。更为基本的是，他说世界历史是在比道德更高的层面上起作用的：
For world history moves on a higher plane than that to which morality properly belongs, which is that of private convictions, the conscience of individuals, and their own particular will and mode of action . . . What is required and achieved by the ultimate purpose of spirit, what is done by providence, lies above the obligations, liability and responsibility which fall to individuality with respect to its ethical life. (VG 171/141)
因为世界历史在一个比道德恰当地归属于它的层面更高的层面运动，道德层面是关乎私人确信、个体的良心和他们自己的特殊意识与行动模式的层面。……必须作为前提并且通过精神的最终目标达到的东西，天意所要完成的东西，远远超过与伦理生活相关而最终落实到个体性的义务、责任和个体性。（VG第171页／第141页）
It is another irony of Hegel’s philosophy of history that, for all its rationalism, it makes the driving force behind history passion rather than reason. The cunning of reason assigns a fundamental role to passion in the realization of the ends of history. Since reason is realized through self-interest, and since the passions are most active in the pursuit of self-interest, passion proves to be crucial in realizing the ends of reason. Hence Hegel preaches that passion is the most potent force in human action: ‘. . . the natural force of passion has a more immediate hold over man than that artificial and laboriously acquired discipline of order and moderation, justice and morality’ (VG 79/68). We seem to read a romantic when Hegel says: ‘. . . nothing great in the world has been accomplished without passion’ (VG 85–6/73). Yet there is nothing really romantic about these lines, since Hegel’s concept of passion came more from self-interest than moral idealism. Thus he explains that he uses the term passion in a broad sense: ‘Passion is not quite the right word for what I am trying to express. I use it here to denote any human activity that is governed by particular interests, special aims, or, if you will, by selfish intentions . . .’ (VG 85/72).
黑格尔历史哲学中另一个反讽是，就所有它的理性主义而言，它使得历史背后的推动力变成了激情，而不是理性。理性的狡计把实现历史的目的中的基本角色指派给了激情。因为理性只有通过自我利益才能实现，因为激情在追逐自我利益过程中是最积极的，所以，激情证明是实现历史的目的过程中最重要的。因此，黑格尔鼓吹，激情是人类行为中最强大的力量：“……激情的自然力量对于人的控制，比如秩序、节制、正义和道德这些人为的和费尽九牛二虎之力才能获得的纪律而言，更加直接。”（VG第85-86页／第73页）然而，在这些段落中看不见任何浪漫派的东西的影子，因为黑格尔的激情概念来自于自我利益而不是道德观念论。就这样，黑格尔解释说，他是在宽泛的意义上使用“激情”这个词的：“就我绞尽脑汁要表达的东西而言，‘激情’这个词并不十分恰当。我在这里使用它是为了表示所有的特殊利益、特殊目标。如果你愿意，你也可以说，‘被自私化的意图’‘所统治的人类活动’……”（VG第85页／第72页）。
Hegel’s demotion of moral idealism, and his promotion of selfinterest, raise the inevitable question: When and how do individuals become conscious of the goals of history? Surely, they must be conscious of them at some point, because Hegel insists that the ends of reason are realized only through individuals, and they could hardly be said to realize them if they were never aware of them at all. It is in answering this question that Hegel states that other notorious theme of his philosophy of history: the world-historical individual (VG 97–103/82–9). These are men like Socrates, Luther, Caesar and Napoleon. They alone have the rare power to rise above the limited horizon of their own age, to see where history is heading, and to realize a higher stage in the self-awareness of freedom. They are the leaders of others, who have no power to resist them and who rally around their banner (VG 99/84). Although they do not have the precise knowledge of the philosopher because they are men of action, they still have the power to grasp the new needs of the age and to see what has to be done to satisfy them (VG 98/83).
黑格尔刻意贬低道德观念论，有意抬高自我利益，从而提出了一个不可回避的问题：“个体在什么时候，又是如何开始意识到历史的目标？”可以确定，他们一定是在某个点意识到历史的目标，因为黑格尔坚持说，理性的目的只有通过个体才能实现，如果他们没有根本上觉察到目的，那么，实现它们也就无从谈起。正是在回答这个问题时，黑格尔陈述了历史哲学另外一个著名的主题：世界历史人物（VG第97-103页／第82-89页）。他们是诸如苏格拉底、路德、凯撒和拿破仑这样的人。唯有他们才有举世无双的力量可以超越他们自己时代的有限眼界，看到历史朝着哪个方向前进，处在实现了自由的自我觉察中的更高阶段。他们是其他人的引路人，其他人没有力量抵制他们，而是团结在他们的旗帜周围（VG第99页／第84页）。尽管因为他们都是行动的人，他们没有哲学家的精确知识，但是他们仍然有力量把握住时代新的需要，以及看到必须做什么才能满足它们（VG第98页／第83页）。
It is only in the case of world-historical individuals that Hegel seems to allow some degree of moral idealism in the realization of history. For he says that these individuals identify themselves with their causes: ‘. . . what they want is the universal; this is their pathos . . .’ (VG 101/86). He objects to those who would reduce their motives to something purely self-interested or personal, such as honor and glory. Thus to Goethe’s famous maxim ‘No one is a hero to his valet’ he adds the explanation that this is because the valet is a valet and not because the hero is not really a hero (VG 103/87–8). But even here we are warned not to regard these heroes as moral idealists; for they too still act more from passion than principle, and they do not let moral scruples stand in the path of their mission: ‘Great men want to satisfy themselves, not the well-meaning intentions of others’ (VG 104/89).
只有在世界历史人物的情形中，黑格尔似乎在历史的现实化中允许某种程度的道德观念论。因为他说，这些人物把他们自己等同于他们的原因：“……他们想要的是普遍；这就是他们的激情……”（VG第101页／第86页）。他反对那些把他们的动机还原为一种纯粹自私自利的或者纯粹个人的东西，例如尊重和荣誉。因此，对于歌德著名的箴言“仆人眼中无英雄”，他添加了一种解释，即这是因为仆人就是仆人，而不是因为英雄实际上并不是英雄（VG 103/第87-88页）。但是甚至在这里，他也警告我们不要把这些英雄看作道德理想主义者；因为他们的行动仍然更多地出自于激情而非原则，他们没有让道德上的顾虑挡住他们的使命：“伟人想要满足他们自己，而非他人的善意”（VG第104页／第89页）。
If these doctrines seem to remove some of the difficulties with Hegel’s philosophy of history, they seem to create others all their own. The cunning of reason seems to encourage fatalism. For if reason realizes itself through self-interest, why should I attempt to be moral at all? If reason realizes itself through all my actions, why should I be a responsible citizen? Both doctrines seem to support an almost brutal Realpolitik, undermining the claims of morality in the political sphere. Thus Hegel tells us that world history operates on a higher plane than morality, that we should not measure historical necessity by moral ideals, and that reason uses people as mere means for its ends. There are several passages in his lectures where Hegel acknowledges the ‘infinite right’ of subjectivity, the value of each and every individual life; but these ring hollow in the face of his callous statement that the world-historical individual ‘must trample many an innocent flower underfoot, and destroy much that lies in its path’ (VG 105/89).
如果这些学说看起来排除了黑格尔历史哲学中的诸多困难，那么，它们自身似乎也产生了许多它们自己的困难。理性的狡猾似乎促进宿命论。因为如果理性只有通过自我利益才能实现自我，那么，为什么我根本上应该试图成为道德的人？如果理性只有通过我的所有行为才能实现自身，那么，为什么我应该成为一个负责任的公民？这两种学说似乎都支持一种几乎残酷无情的实用政治（Realpolitik），削弱了政治领域中的道德主张。就这样，黑格尔告诉我们，世界历史是在一个比道德更高的层面上运行，我们不应该根据道德观念来测度历史的必然性，理性把人们仅仅当成达到它的目的的手段。在他的讲座中的好几个段落里，黑格尔认识到主观性的“无限的权利”，每一个和所有主体的价值；但是，在面对他那冷酷无情的陈述——世界历史人物“必须把很多天真无辜的花朵践踏在脚下，在通行理性的道路上横扫千军”（VG第105页／第89页）——时，这些段落听起来非常虚伪。
Yet for all its fatalism and amoralism, there is still a sense in which the cunning of reason is still profoundly moralistic. The whole purpose of the concept is to show that reason ultimately triumphs over moral cynicism after all, for it states that reason is more cunning than the most clever practitioner of Realpolitik (p. 220). Even in pursuing raison d’état the statesman will be the vehicle of the highest end of reason: the self-awareness that man as such is free.
然而，尽管它具有命定主义和非道德主义的蕴含，理性的狡计还在某种意义上是极端道德主义的。这个概念的全部目的是在指出，理性最终会在根本上战胜道德上的犬儒主义，因为它说的是，理性比从事实用政治的最聪明的政治家们更加狡猾（第220页）。甚至在追求国家理由（raison d'etat）时，政治家也将会是理性实现最高目的的工具：人自我觉察到自身是自由的。
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
恶的问题
In his lectures on world history Hegel identifies his central thesis that reason governs the world with the traditional Christian idea of providence (VG 77/67). He likens the reason that rules history to the divine plan behind it, as if reason arose from the will of God. The fundamental task of the philosophy of world history, he explains, is to comprehend that ‘God governs the world’. For world history consists in nothing more than ‘the content of his government and the execution of [the divine] plan’ (VG 77/67).
在他论述世界历史的讲座中，黑格尔把他的核心主题“理性统治世界”等同于传统基督教的天意理念（VG第77页/67页）。他把统治历史的理性和在它背后的神圣计划联系起来，就好像理性来自于上帝的意志。他解释说，世界历史哲学的基本任务就是理解“上帝统治世界”。因为世界历史无非包含着“它的统治和（神圣的）计划的执行过程的内容”（VG第77页/67页）。
Although Hegel attempts to reinstate the traditional idea of providence, he also gives it an entirely immanent or this-worldly meaning. According to the Christian tradition, life on earth is only a means toward a higher end: eternal salvation. History is only a pilgrimage, a trial of passage, on the road toward the city of God. True to his immanent theology, Hegel denies that there is a supernatural realm lying beyond history that gives it purpose, meaning or value. Since the end of history does not lie beyond it, redemption has to be achieved in history itself.
尽管黑格尔试图恢复传统的天意理念，但是他也赋予它以完全内在的或者此世的意义。依照基督教传统，尘世的生活仅仅是通往更高的目的——永恒的得救——的手段。历史仅仅是通往上帝之城的道路上的一段朝圣之旅，一段审判之路（a trial of passage）。黑格尔忠实于他的内在目的论，否认有一个在历史之上的，并且赋予历史以目标、意义和价值的超自然领域。因为历史的目的本就不在历史之外，所以，必须在历史之中获得救赎。
The fundamental problem for any belief in providence – whether immanent or transcendent – is the existence of evil. If evil exists, how can there be providence? For why would God, who is infinite and good, create, or even allow for, evil? One of Hegel’s main ambitions in his philosophy of history was to resolve this thorny issue. Hence he described it as a theodicy, as an attempt to justify the ways of God to human beings (VG 48/42). After pondering the tragedies of history, he explicitly poses the problem of evil by asking ‘. . . to whom, to what ultimate end . . . have these monstrous sacrifices been made’ (VG 80/69). Hegel had to face the problem of evil because he stated explicitly and emphatically the two central premises that sustain it. First, he insisted that God is essentially good, not only in the design he makes for the world but also in the power with which he executes it (VG 77/67). Second, he also fully admitted the reality of evil. In some memorable lines he declared that history is a ‘slaughter bench’ (Schlachtbank) on which tremendous sacrifices have been made (VG 80/69). The periods of happiness are empty pages in the book of history (VG 92/79).
对于天意的任何信仰——无论是内在的，还是外在的——来说，基本的疑难是恶的存在。如果存在着恶，那么，怎么可能存在着天意？因为为什么无限而善良的上帝居然会创造出或者甚至允许恶的存在？黑格尔历史哲学中一个巨大的野心是想要解决棘手的问题。因此，他把他的历史哲学描述成一种神正论，描述为证成上帝通往人类之路的尝试（VG第48页／第42页）。在沉思了历史的悲剧之后，黑格通过追问“……这些惨绝人寰的牺牲到底是为了谁，为了什么样的终极目的……而制造出来的”（VG80页/69页）而明确地提出了这个问题。黑格尔必须面对恶的问题，因为他明确断言支持这个问题的两个前提。首先，他强调说，上帝本质上是善良的，不仅仅在他为世界所作的设计之中是善良的，而且在他执行这个设计的所凭借的力量中也是善良的（VGdi 77页／第67页）。其次，他完全承认恶的实在性。在某些过目可诵的段落中，他宣称，历史是“屠宰凳”（Schlachtbank），在屠宰凳上供奉着大量的牺牲（VG第80／第69页）。在历史书中，幸福的时期都是空白的页码。（VG 92/79）
Although the problem of evil arises for any belief in God – for theism and deism as well as absolute idealism – it is for two reasons an especially acute problem for absolute idealism. First, absolute idealism connects the divine with the world, making everything in nature and history a manifestation of the divine; hence the evil deeds of history will not only be allowed by the divine but they will be part of its very nature. Second, absolute idealism seems to make evil, like all events in nature and history, inevitable, a necessary manifestation of the laws of reason. Whatever a man or woman does is done by God acting through him or her, and so by the necessity of the divine nature. This poses the danger of fatalism, because it seems impossible to do otherwise.
尽管恶的问题起源于任何对于上帝的信仰——对无神论和自然神论以及绝对观念论来说亦为是——是一个尖锐的问题，出于两个理由，它对于绝对观念论而言是一个尤其尖锐的问题。首先，绝对观念论将神性与世界联系起来，使自然与历史中的所有事物都是神性的显现；因此，历史中的恶性事件不仅是神性所允许的，而且它们会是其本性的一部分。其次，绝对观念论似乎使得恶，就像自然与历史中的所有事件一样，是不可避免的，是理性规律的必然显现。无论一个男人还是女人做什么，都是上帝通过他或她的行动所做出来的事，而且也是神圣的自然所必然做出来的事。这就提出了命定主义的危险，因为似乎一切都别无可能。
How did Hegel attempt to deal with these problems? What was his explanation for the existence of evil? True to his this-worldly conception of providence, Hegel’s theodicy attempts to explain evil and to redeem suffering within the realm of history itself. His explanation for evil is that it is necessary to historical progress, a regrettable but essential stage on the road toward the self-awareness of freedom. Like Kant, Schiller and Herder, Hegel explained history according to a secularized version of the Christian innocence–fall– redemption scenario.2 He understood each of these stages in terms of specific historical epochs: innocence was the Greek world where man lived in unity with himself, others and nature; the fall came with the onset of Christianity, where the individual gave himself supreme significance apart from the community and nature; and redemption – still to be achieved in the Germanic world – came when mankind restored its unity on a higher level that would preserve the rights of individuality. Evil came with the fall, the lapse from the paradise of unity. The fall was necessary because, to realize its freedom, mankind had to develop its powers of reflection, its capacity to think for itself. But in developing such a capacity it had separated itself from its original unity and no longer felt at home in the world.
黑格尔试图怎样处理这些困难呢？他又是怎样解释恶的存在的呢？黑格尔忠实于他的此世的天意的思想，他的神正论试图在历史的领域之内解释恶或者为受苦受难赎罪。他关于恶的解释是，它是历史进步中必不可少的东西，是通往自由的自我觉察之路上虽有所遗憾但却本质的阶段。就像康德、席勒和赫尔德一样，黑格尔也是用一种基督教的“天真—堕落—救赎”的剧本的世俗化版本来解释历史2。他依据几个具体的历史时期来解释每一个阶段：天真是古希腊世界，在那里，人们生活在与他自己、他人和自然的统一性之中；堕落随着基督教的开端一同来临，在这个时期，个体赋予其自身的除共同体和自然之外最高的意义。救赎——仍然有待于在日尔曼世界之中达到的——到来之时，人类在更高的层面上恢复了它的统一性，又保留了个体的权利。恶随着堕落——从天堂的统一性中偏离正道——而来。这种堕落是必不可少的，因为，为了实现自由，人类必须发展供自身反思的力量，它为自己而思考自我的能力。但是在发展这样能力之时，它已经把它自身同它原本的统一性分离开来了，已在世界上不再有在家之感。
The heart of Hegel’s theodicy ultimately lies with his concept of spirit. In the passage of spirit toward self-realization, evil appears during the moment of difference, of inner division, when the spirit is alienated from itself. We have seen how spirit realizes itself only when it incorporates the other into itself, and that to do this it must first oppose itself to the other (pp. 114–15). More specifically, the stage of division has two aspects: first, the self opposes itself to the other; second, the self still depends on the other. The self fights the other to assert its independence, not realizing that it finds its true independence only in and through the other. Since the self fights the other when its higher identity comes only from incorporating the other, it is divided within itself. This is the moment of evil because, in attempting to destroy what is really essential to itself, the self suffers torment and agony; it is its own worst enemy, though it still does not fully understand why. If we understand evil as the inner division of spirit, which is a necessary stage in the selfrealization of spirit, then we can grasp the necessity of evil itself. We can also understand, however, how evil can be justified and redeemed, for the stage of division is overcome when the self finally incorporates the other within itself and makes itself whole again.
黑格尔神正论的核心最终还得靠他的精神概念。在精神通往自我实现的路途中，恶是在差异的环节内部分化的环节的过程中显现的，这时精神从它自身中外化出去。我们已经看到精神如何在只有把他者融入自身之时才能实现它自身，以及为了做到这一点，它必须首先把自身与他者对立起来（第114-115页）。更具体地说，划分的阶段有两个方面：首先，自我将它自身与他者对立起来；其次，自我仍然依赖他者，自我同他者相斗争以肯定它的独立，而没有意识到只有在他者之中并且通过他者，它才能实现它真实的独立。因为自我在同他者相斗争之时，自我的更高的同一性只能来自于把他者融入自身之中，它就在它自身之中发生分化。这就是恶的环节，因为，在试图破坏对它自身而言的本质之物时，自我经受着折磨与苦难的痛苦；它是它自己最坏的敌人，尽管它仍然不能充分地理解为什么会这样。如果我们把恶理解为精神的内部分化，而它又是精神的自我实现的过程中一个必要的阶段，那么，我们就能把握恶自身的必然性了。然而，我们还能够理解，恶怎样证明其正当性，并且被救赎的，因为分化的阶段是可以被克服的，就在自我最终将他者融入自身之中，并使其自身重新变成整体之时。
In attempting to incorporate evil into his philosophy of history, Hegel develops a distinctive concept of progress. He contrasts his concept with that of the Enlightenment, according to which history consists in gradual improvement, the increasing refinement of culture (VG 150/125–6). This merely quantitative notion of progress fails to grasp, he believes, the necessity of conflict and struggle for the development of spirituality itself. If, however, we have a qualitative notion of progress, according to which struggle and conflict are necessary for spiritual development, then we begin to see the necessity of evil itself. In Hegel’s fundamentally optimistic account, nothing is lost or done in vain in the realm of history. All struggles in the past are preserved as necessary moments toward the selfawareness of freedom. Once we see the necessity of evil, and the necessity of its overcoming, Hegel hopes, we will finally reconcile ourselves to history (VG 67/78). We fail to reconcile ourselves only when we stand outside it and judge it by extrinsic moral standards. All our indignation at the evil of history will collapse, however, once we recognize the necessity of its intrinsic ends, which are realized through both evil and its redemption.
在试图将恶融入他的历史哲学之时，黑格尔发展出了一个独具特色的进步概念。他的进步概念同启蒙运动的进步概念对立起来：依据后者，历史就存在于循序渐进的改善之中，文化的日益精致美化之中（VG150页/125-126页）。他认为，这种纯粹是量的进步概念，并没有能够把握住为了精神性自身的发展而必然产生的冲突和斗争。然而，如果我们拥有一种质的进步的观念，并据此认定斗争与冲突对于精神的发展而言是必不可少的，那么，我们就可以看到恶自身存在的必然性。在黑格尔对乐观主义本质的解释中，在历史的领域里没有什么会丧失殆尽，或者没有什么会徒劳无功。过去的所有斗争都作为通往自由的自我觉察的必然环节而被保存起来。黑格尔希望，一旦我们认识到恶的必然性，以及它被克服的必然性，那么我们最终就能让我们自己和历史达成和解（VG67/78）。只有在我们站在历史之外，并且依据外在的道德标准来评判它，那么，我们就不能让我们自己和历史达成和解。然而，一旦我们认识到它的内在目的的必然性，以及这种目的通过恶及对它的救赎这两者可以实现，我们对于历史上的恶的全部愤慨（indignation）都将会烟消云散。
Such is, in its crudest outline, Hegel’s theodicy. Though a self- conscious Christian project, it was highly original, departing radically from the Christian tradition in at least three respects. First, it attempts to redeem evil within this world alone, avoiding all appeal to a transcendent realm. Second, it is not dualistic, because it sees good and evil as two sides of the same spiritual development. Third, it stresses not only the reality but the necessity of evil. Hegel’s theory is very far from that so often ascribed to him: that the reality of evil is illusory, disappearing when we grasp the universe as a whole.
从它最粗糙的纲要上说，这就是黑格尔的神正论。尽管它是一个自我意识的基督教式规划。但是，它是具有高度原创性的，它至少在三个方面彻底地离开了基督教的传统。首先，它试图只在此世之中为恶寻求救赎，避免所有诉诸一个超验领域的作法。其次，它不是二元论的，因为它把善与恶看作同一个精神运动的两个方面。第三，它不仅强调恶的实在性，而且强调恶的必然性。黑格尔的理论与人们常常归之于他的那种理论——恶的实在是一种幻相，在我们把握到宇宙整体时它就消失不见了——大相径庭。
But, for all its originality, Hegel’s theodicy suffers from problems all its own. It is noteworthy that the theory works on different levels, individual and cosmic, which involve incompatible explanations for the existence of evil. On the individual level, the explanation of evil arises from human choice alone. Hegel explains that evil arises when the will chooses to act on its natural desires rather than according to the moral law of reason. The self has the power to choose good over evil; still it chooses evil, even when it has the power to do otherwise. Hegel stresses this point when he attempts to avoid imputing evil to God and to devolve responsibility for evil on the human will alone (VPR III 298/222; PR §139R + A). On the cosmic level, the explanation for evil arises from the divine nature. It holds that evil consists in the inner division of the divine nature. Hegel stresses that this moment of negation is not something contingent that merely happens; rather, it is essential to the divine nature itself, being necessary to its self-realization (PG ¶¶775–6; VPR III 306/229). The problem is that these explanations are incompatible with one another: the first sees the human will as the sole source of evil, whereas the second makes it an essential moment of the divine nature. The first sees evil as something contingent, depending on an act of choice that could be otherwise; the second views it as something necessary, the indispensable condition for the self-realization of spirit.
但是，就它的所有原创性而言，黑格尔的神正论也经受许多来自于它自身的困难。值得注意的是，理论在不同的水平上，个体的和宇宙的发生作用，就恶的存在而言，这些水平涉及互不相容的解释。在个体的水平上，关于恶的解释只是来自于人的选择。黑格尔解释说，在意志选择依据它的自然欲望而非依据理性的道德法则行动时，恶就产生了。自我有力量选择善而非恶；但是它仍然选择恶，即使在它有力量另作选择之时。在黑格尔试图避免把恶归咎于上帝，并只把恶的责任移交到人类意志之时，他强调了这一点（VPR，第三卷，298页/222页；PR第139节附释和补充）。在宇宙的水平上，对恶的解释来自于神的本性。它认为，恶存在于神的本性的内在分化中。黑格尔强调说，这个否定的环节并非某种只是碰巧发生的偶然的东西；毋宁说，它对于神的本性自身来说是本质的东西，是它的自我实现中必不可少的（PG9/9/775-776；VPR第三卷，306页/229页）。问题是，这两种解释彼此互不相容：第一种解释把人的意志看作是恶的唯一来源，而第二种解释把它变成神的本性的一个本质环节。第一种解释把恶看作是偶然的东西，依赖于一个既可以这样又可以那样的选择行为；第二种解释把它看作是某种必然的东西，精神的自我实现的不可或缺的条件。
Apart from these problems, there are other reasons to question Hegel’s theodicy. First, we can ask, with Ivan Karamazov, whether any goal, and any amount of progress toward it, can redeem the suffering of the innocent. Is it not better to renounce these goals, and this progress, if their realization requires such evil? Second, Hegel’s concept of evil as self-negation seems to account for only one kind of evil, that which arises from inner struggle; but there are other kinds of evil that are not forms of inner struggle; for example, all forms of crime, such as murder, abuse, genocide. It is precisely the existence of wanton and brutal forms of crime that makes the problem of evil so apparently insolvable. Third, Hegel’s theory seems to encourage acquiescence in the face of evil. Rather than demanding that people fight evil, absolute idealism tranquilizes its believers into accepting it, because they become convinced of its necessity. The result of believing in such a doctrine, William James contends, is that we accept finite evil ‘as if it were potentially the eternal’, and so we abrogate ourselves from all responsibility to combat it.3
除了这些疑难，还有另外一些理由可以质疑黑格尔的神正论。首先，我们可以问，是否任何目标，朝向它的任何数量的进步，都可以救赎无辜者的受苦受难？如果目标与进步的实现要以这种恶为前提，那么，宣布放弃这些目标或者进步，难道不是更好吗？黑格尔的作为自我否定的恶的概念似乎仅仅可以解释某一种恶，那种从内部斗争中升起来的恶；但是还有其他类型的恶并非内部斗争的形式；例如，所有形式的犯罪，比如谋杀，虐待，种族大屠杀等。正是这种习以为常却又蛮不讲理的形式的犯罪，使得恶的问题似乎不可解决。第三，黑格尔的理论似乎鼓励面临恶时保持缄默。绝对观念论使它的信众镇定自若地接受它，而不是请求民众与恶相斗争，因为他们心悦诚服地接受它的必然性。威廉·詹姆斯争辩说，信仰这样一种学说的结果是，我们接受有限的恶，“就好像它是潜在的永恒”，所以，我们就取消了我们与之作斗争的所有责任。3
In the light of all the horrors of the twentieth century the optimism of Hegel’s theodicy appears dated and naive. The issue has been put in the most forceful terms by Emile Fackenheim:
鉴于二十世纪的所有恐怖事件，黑格尔神正论的乐观主义看起来既是明日黄花，又是天真可笑。爱弥儿·法肯海姆以最强烈的方式提出了这个问题：
Hegel’s actuality of the rational leaves room only for worldhistorically insignificant evils to be disposed of as relapses into tribalism or barbarism. In their post-Enlightenment optimism all but a few modern philosophers have ignored or denied the demonic. Hegel’s philosophy . . . is the most radical and hence most serious expression of this modern tendency . . . Any inquiry into [the] truth [of Hegel’s philosophy] must confront its claims with the gas chambers of Auschwitz.4
黑格尔的理性的实现，仅仅为具有世界历史意义的恶留下空间，把它处理为再度堕落到宗派意识或者野蛮主义。在他们的后启蒙时期的乐观主义中，除了少数几个以外的全部现代哲学家都忽略了或者否定了恶魔般的存在。黑格尔的哲学……是这种现代倾向最彻底的且因此是最严肃的表达。……任何对于（黑格尔哲学的）真理的探究，必须使它的主张与奥斯维辛的毒气室当面对证。4
Given Hegel’s qualitative concept of progress, we might question Fackenheim’s claim that the evils of history will be only minor relapses. Still, Fackenheim’s main point stands unimpugned: for what could ever redeem such a horror? We might put Fackenheim’s point like this: Auschwitz negates double negation, the power of spirit to transcend itself.
如果黑格尔的进步概念是质的意义上的，那么，我们就必须质疑法肯海姆的主张，即历史上的诸种恶仅仅是故态复萌。但是，法肯海姆的主要观点仍然是无可指责的：因为什么才能为这种恐怖提供救赎？也许我们可以这样来表述法肯海姆的观点：奥斯维辛否定了这种双重否定，否定了试图超越它自身精神的力量。
THE MEANING OF LIFE
生命的意义
Hegel was intent on reviving the traditional concept of providence not least because he saw it as the only viable solution to the grand existential question about the meaning or purpose of life. That concept had always provided a ready and comforting answer to that fraught question. According to the Christian tradition, the meaning of life is to fulfill the purpose of God in creating us. God had a reason in creating each and every one of us, a reason for making us here and now, even if it is almost impossible for us to fathom it. We still know, however, that God intends us to fulfill our roles in society and state, because society and state, and all specific roles within them, are part of providence. Acting according to our station and its duties therefore has a divine sanction.
黑格尔有意复兴传统的天意概念，不仅仅是因为他把它看作关于生命的意义如此宏大的生存论问题唯一可行的解决方案。这个概念一直在为那个令人焦虑的问题提供现成的且令人欣慰的答案。依照基督教传统，生活的意义就是完成上帝在创造我们之时的目标。上帝在创造我们每一个人和所有人之时有一种理性（理由），使我们身处此时此地的理性（理由），即使我们几乎不可能对之追根究底。然而，我们依旧知道，上帝期望我们完成我们在国家和社会中的角色，因为社会和国家，以及它们之中所有具体的角色，都是天意的一部分。因此，依照我们的岗位以及它的职责而行动就有了神圣的支持。
Although Hegel purged the Christian concept of providence of its traditional transcendent meaning, he still retained its underlying thesis that the purpose or meaning of life came from fulfilling my place in the divine order. He did not accept the doctrine of modern existentialists that life could have a value or meaning even if existence were absurd, or even if there were no purpose to life.5 In his view, no individual had by himself the power to give his life meaning, to create the values by which he lived. The purpose of his life had to be made for him by the greater wholes of society, state and history, which give the individual a specific role to perform. Hegel held that his immanent theology could give our lives on earth a much greater meaning and significance than they ever had in the Christian tradition. Since God does not exist apart from history, and since he realizes himself only through it, our deeds and struggles become necessary for the realization of the divine nature itself. Our lives on earth not only prepare us for the kingdom of God, as in the traditional Christian conception: they create that very kingdom. Hegel was perfectly explicit about the point:
尽管黑格尔净化了基督教天意概念中传统的超越意义，但是他仍然保存了它的基础性论题，即生命的意义或者目标来自于履行我在神圣的秩序中某个位置的职责。他并不接受现代生存主义者的学说，即使存在是荒诞的，或者即使生活没有目标，生活都可能有一个价值或意义。5在他看来，没有任何个体单凭自己就有力量赋予他的生命以意义，创造出他所借以活下去的诸价值。他的生命的目标必须是由社会、国家和历史这个更大的整体为它设定的，这个更大的整体赋予每个个体一个特定的角色去扮演。黑格尔坚持说，他的内在目的论能够赋予我们尘世的生命比他们在基督教传统中曾经有过的生命更大的意义和重要性。既然上帝不在历史之外存在，既然它仅仅通过历史而意识到自身，那么，我们的功绩和斗争对于神性的实现而言就是必不可少的。我们尘世的生命不仅为我们准备好了上帝的王国，就像在传统的基督教思想中一样：他们还创造了那个王国。关于这点，黑格尔毫无疑义：
The province of the spirit is created by man himself; and whatever ideas we may form of the kingdom of God, it must always remain a spiritual kingdom that is realized in man and that man is expected to translate into actuality. (VG 50/44)
精神的范围是由人自身创造的；关于上帝的王国，无论我们形成的是什么样的理念，它必定总是保持为精神的王国，这个王国是在人当中实现的，人被期望着把它转变成现实。（VG 60页/44页）
The inspiration for Hegel’s immanent theodicy lay as much in the pagan as the Christian tradition. If the Christian tradition gave Hegel his concept of providence, the pagan tradition made him turn this concept to this-worldly political ends. True to the pagan tradition, Hegel maintains that the purpose of life is to be found within one specific form of life on earth: its political form, the state. Like Plato and Aristotle, Hegel thinks that the highest good – the supreme value of life – can be achieved only within the state, which shapes not only the identity of each individual but the very purpose and meaning of his life. Hence he declares: ‘Man owes his entire existence to the state, and has his being within it alone. Whatever worth and spiritual reality he possesses are his solely by virtue of the state’ (VG 111/94). Each individual should find the meaning of his life, therefore, by participating in the affairs of the state, by becoming a good citizen who fulfills his station and its duties. His worth and value as an individual depend entirely on what he contributes to society and state as the whole. ‘The worth of individuals is measured by the extent to which they reflect and represent the national spirit, and have adopted a particular station within the affairs of the state as a whole’ (VG 94/80). The idea that our lives could have any meaning or purpose apart from the state, Hegel believes, rests on a false abstraction, on assuming that the individual has some identity apart from the social and political whole of which he is a part. We are not existential heroes who give our lives meaning through individual acts of choice, apart from our specific place in society and the state.
启发黑格尔的内在目的论的，既有基督教传统，同样程度上也有异教传统。如果说基督教传统给与黑格尔他的天意概念的话，那么，异教传统使他把这个概念转向此世的政治目的。由于忠实于异教传统，黑格尔坚持认为，生命的目标应该在尘世的某种特定的生命形式中发现：它的政治的形式——国家。与柏拉图和亚里士多德一样，黑格尔认为，最高的善（至善）——生命的最高价值——只能在国家制造获得，国家不仅塑造了每一个个体的同一性，而且塑造了他的生命的目标与目的。因此，他宣称：“人应该把他的存在归功于国家，他只有在国家中才拥有他的生命。无论他拥有什么样的价值和精神实在，都是他单单凭借国家取得的。”（VG第94页／第80页）黑格尔相信，我们的生命在国家之外有任何意义和目标，这个想法建基于某种虚假的抽象之上。建基于这种假定之上，个体在他本是其中一部分的社会和政治整体之外具有某种身份。除了我们在社会和在国家中的具体位置之外，我们不是通过我们个体的选择行为而赋予我们的生命以意义的生存论的英雄。
The proper meaning of these statements becomes apparent only when we read them in the context of Hegel’s development. They reflect his critique of traditional Christian ethics, a critique that derives from the republican tradition of Machiavelli and Rousseau. In his Berne Fragments and Positivity Essay he argued that in the ancient Roman republic and the Greek city-state the individual found the entire purpose of his life in serving the state. The citizen would find meaning only by helping to create and administer the laws, and by being ready to die for the republic. The thought never occurred to the citizen, Hegel wrote, that his life could have some meaning, let alone existence, apart from the state. The Christian ethic of salvation arose, he argued, only after the decline of the ancient republics. When the state no longer served the common good but was taken over by private interests, the individual sought the highest good outside the earthly sphere altogether in his eternal salvation. The mature Hegel never departed from his critique of the traditional doctrine of salvation, and remained true to his early belief that the purpose of life had to be found within the state. He did, however, give this doctrine a new religious significance by seeing life within the state as an essential part of providence.
只有在我们把它们放进黑格尔的发展的语境中进行解读之时，这些陈述的恰切意义才会显露无遗。它们反映了他对传统的基督教伦理学的批判，这种批判源自于马基雅维利和卢梭的共和国传统。在他的《伯尔尼残篇》和《实证性论文》中，他论证说，在古罗马共和国和希腊城邦中，个体在为国家服务时发现了他的生命的全部意义。公民只有在帮助创造和执行法律时，以及在乐于为共和国献出生命时，才会发现这种意义。黑格尔写道，这种思想从未掠过那种公民的脑际，他的生命在国家之外还可能有某种意义，更别说存在了。他论证说，基督教的拯救伦理仅仅是在古代共和国衰亡之后才兴起的。当国家不再服务于公共的善，而被私人利益所接管时，个体就在尘世的领域之外的他个人的永恒得救中寻求至善了。成熟的黑格尔从来不曾偏离他对于传统的拯救学说的批判，并对他早期的信念——生命的目标必须在国家之中才能发现——保持着忠诚。然而，他的确通过把国家之中的生命看作天命论的本质部分而赋予这种学说以一种新的宗教意义。
HEGEL VERSUS THE EXISTENTIALISTS
黑格尔反对存在主义者
Because of Hegel’s influence and reputation, his philosophy of history eventually became the central target of two of his most influential critics, Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche. Kierkegaard in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript, and Nietzsche in his Untimely Meditations, reacted against Hegel because of the central role he gave to history in understanding the self and in answering the question of the purpose of life. They objected to Hegel’s conception of the self as an essentially social and political animal, and they protested against his claim that the purpose of life lay in performing one’s role in state and history. It is in their critique of Hegel’s historicism that we can detect the glimmerings of later existentialism.6
因为黑格尔的影响与声望，他的历史哲学最终变成了他的两个最著名的批评者——索伦·克尔凯郭尔和弗里德里希·尼采——的核心靶子。克尔凯郭尔在《非科学性的结论附言》一书中，以及尼采在他的《不合时宜的沉思》一书中，激烈抨击黑格尔，因为他在理解自我和在回答生命的目标问题时赋予历史以核心的作用。他们对于黑格尔把自我构想为本质上是社会的和政治的动物持有异议，他们反对他主张生命的目标在于履行他在国家和社会中的角色。正是在他们对于黑格尔的历史主义的批判中，我们可以窥测到后来存在主义的微光。6
For all their differences as thinkers, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche have a remarkably similar critique of Hegel. Both see the same basic danger in Hegel’s emphasis on history: that one loses oneself in the past and forfeits one’s existence as an individual. In their view, Hegel’s historicism undermines our individual autonomy, the need for each of us to think for ourselves about the fundamental questions of life. For determining our place in society and history teaches us only what others have thought long ago; it should not determine what each of us should think for ourselves right now. Hegel assumes that we find ourselves by determining our place in society and history; but the very opposite is the case: we only lose ourselves, because who we are is ultimately determined by our sheer individuality, which resists reduction to social and historical roles. It is only by abstracting from society and history, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche argue, that we can finally face the eternal existential questions of life that each individual must ultimately resolve for himself. To settle these questions, Nietzsche advises us to find a ‘suprahistorical’ standpoint where values are eternal and not marred by the interests and injustices of history.7
尽管作为思想家，克尔凯郭尔和尼采不无差别，但是在批判黑格尔这一点上却是惊人的相似。他们俩都在黑格尔对于历史的强调中看到同一种基本的危险：人们有可能迷失在历史之中，而丧失了他作为个体的存在。在他们眼中，黑格尔的历史主义削弱了我们个体的自律，削弱了我们每一个人为我们自己思考生命的基本问题的需要。因为规定我们在社会和历史中的位置，这仅仅教导我们从前他人思考过什么；它不应该规定我们每一个人现在应该为我们自己思考什么。黑格尔假定，我们通过规定我们在社会和历史中的位置而发现我们自己；但是实情正好与之相反：我们只会丧失我们自己，因为我们是谁，最终是由我们的纯粹个体性所规定的，这种个体性抵制被还原为社会和历史的角色。克尔凯郭尔和尼采论证说，只有通过从社会和历史中撤离出来，我们才能最终面对永恒的生命存在的问题，每一个个体必须最终为自己解决这个问题。为了解决这些问题，尼采建议我们寻求一种“超历史的”立场。在这个立场上，价值是永恒的，不会受到历史的兴趣和不公正的污损。7
Are Kierkegaard and Nietzsche justified in their complaint that Hegel’s historicism neglects, and even undermines, the value of individuality? There are many passages in Hegel’s Philosophy of History that seem to vindicate them. We have already seen how he thinks that the worth of the individual consists in the performance of his duties in society and state. But this is scarcely the end of the matter. Hegel also sometimes writes as if the individual were simply a means for social and historical ends: ‘Reason cannot stop to consider the injuries sustained by single individuals, for particular ends are submerged in the universal end’ (VG 48–9/43). He seems to commit the very mistake Kierkegaard and Nietzsche impute to him when he states that the individual should be subordinated to the universal and that he should be regarded ‘under the category of means rather than ends’ (VG 106/90). He insists that, apart from an elite few, ‘individuals fade into insignificance beside the universal substance’ (VG 60/52). The only individuals that really matter for Hegel are the few world-historical individuals; and they are perfectly justified in treating other individuals as means toward their ends (VG 105/89).
在抱怨黑格尔的历史主义忽视甚至削弱了个体性的价值之时，克尔凯郭尔和尼采的理由充分吗？在黑格尔的《历史哲学》中有很多片段看起来坐实了他们的抱怨。我们已经看到，他是如何思考个体价值就在于他履行他在社会和国家之中的义务之中的。但是，这绝非事情的最终状况。黑格尔有时写作起来，就好像个体只是社会和历史目的的手段：“理性不能停下来考察单一的个体所承受的伤害，因为目的的特殊性被淹没在目的的普遍性之中”（VG第48-49页/43页）。在他说个体性应该从属于普遍性，而且他应该被看作是“属于手段而非目的的范畴之下”之时（VG第60页／第52页），他似乎犯了克尔凯郭尔和尼采归罪于他的那种过错。他坚持说，除了寥若晨星般的几个精英，“个体逐渐变成普遍的实体旁边的微不足道之物”（VG第60页／第52页）。黑格尔真正关心的个体只是为数极少的世界历史性的个人；他们可以完美地为他们把其他个体仅仅当做通往他们的目的的手段进行证明（VG第105页／第89页）。
The issue is more complicated, however, because there are other passages where Hegel does seem to give great importance to individuality, and where he even emphasizes that individuality has ‘an infinite right’ to be satisfied in history. As if he wishes to parry the very objection that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche hurl against him, he insists that individuality has an intrinsic worth, and that we must regard each individual as an end in himself (VG 106/90). At this point Hegel reasserts the ‘right of subjectivity’, which claims that individuality has an infinite worth (pp. 230–1). Whenever he acts for social, political or historical ends, each individual has ‘an infinite right to be satisfied’ in the sense that his own personal interests and needs must also be fulfilled. Since their own individuality must be satisfied in acting for universal ends, they are never simply means toward these ends but part of the ends themselves. It would seem, then, that Nietzsche’s and Kierkegaard’s criticism ultimately rests on a misreading of Hegel: it fails to see how Hegel attempts to integrate the right of subjectivity or individuality within history.
然而，这个问题要错综复杂得多，因为在很多片段中，黑格尔的确赋予个体性以极大的重要意义，他甚至在那些段落中强调，个体性具有要在历史中得到满足的“无限的权利”。就好像它可以招架住克尔凯郭尔和尼采猛力投掷给他的异议一样，他坚持认为，个体性具有内在的价值，我们必须把每一个个体看作是他自身之中的目的（VG 106页／第90页）。在这一点上，黑格尔再次肯定了“主观性的权利”，它主张，个体性具有无限的价值（第230-1页）。无论每一个个体什么时候为了社会的、政治的或历史的目的而行动，他也有“需要满足的无限权利”，而且是在以下意义上，他自己的个人的利益与需求必须也得到满足。因为他们自己的个体性必须在为了普遍的目的的行动中得到满足，所以，他们从来就不仅仅是通往这些目的的手段，而本身就是目的的一部分。那么，看起来尼采和克尔凯郭尔对于黑格尔的批判最终是建立在对于黑格尔的误读的基础之上的：它没有能够看到黑格尔如何设法把主观性的权利或者个体性整合到历史之中。
It is important to see, however, that Hegel equivocates on this crucial question. If in some respects he attempts to incorporate individuality inside history, in others he admits that it falls outside history. The more he stresses the right of subjectivity, the more he places individuality outside the whole realm of history. Thus he concedes that even the religion and morals of ‘a restricted sphere of life’, such as that of shepherd or peasant, have an ‘infinite worth’ apart from their role in history (VG 109/92). He recognizes that ‘the inner centre, the personal source of morality and religion’, ‘remains untouched and protected from the noisy clamour of world history’ (VG 109/92). And he stresses that world history operates on a plane so much higher than individual morality that it should ignore the realm of individuality entirely (VG 171/141). These seem to be fatal concessions on Hegel’s part, for they basically take the fundamental question of the purpose and value of life outside the realm of society and history, just as Nietzsche and Kierkegaard insist.
然而，重要的是看到，黑格尔在这个至关重要的问题上是含糊其词的。如果说，在某些方面，他试图把个体性整合进历史之中；那么，在另外一些方面，他却承认个体退出了历史之外。他越是强调主观性的权利，他越是把个体性置于整个的历史领域之外。就这样，他承认，甚至“一个受限的生命领域”的宗教与道德，比如，牧羊人或农民的宗教与道德，除了他们在历史中的角色之外，也具有“无限的价值”（VG第109页／第92页）。他承认，“道德和宗教的内在核心，个人源泉”，“对于世界历史的喧嚣吵嚷而言保持为未被触及的和受到保护的”（VG第109页／第92页）。从黑格尔的方面来看，这些似乎都是决定性的妥协，因为它们基本上把生命的目标和价值问题放置在社会和历史的领域之外，就像克尔凯郭尔和尼采所坚持认为的那样。
Apart from these concessions, Hegel still has a powerful reply to Kierkegaard’s and Nietzsche’s critique. He could claim that his critics have an implausible asocial and ahistorical conception of individuality. They assume that a person’s individuality were somehow separable from its specific place in society and history; but such a conception is a false abstraction, he could argue, because the identity of a person ultimately depends upon its place in society and history. If we attempt to abstract the individual from this place, we are not even left with a human being but a mere cipher. Furthermore, there is no set of eternal problems and concerns that hold for an individual just in so far as he or she is an individual; for these depend entirely upon the individual’s social and political context. It is indeed striking that when Kierkegaard lists the questions that should concern every concrete existing individual they turn out to be historically and culturally conditioned. The questions ‘What does it mean to be immortal?’, ‘What does it mean to thank God?’ are questions that would interest only someone who believes in the Christian doctrine of salvation – a doctrine that Hegel questions and situates in the culture of the decline of Rome. Hegel could then pose Kierkegaard and Nietzsche with a dilemma: it seems that the more concrete we make the individual, the more it turns out to be a social and historical animal; and that the more we deal with the individual as such, the more it turns into a mere abstraction.
除了这些让步，黑格尔对于克尔凯郭尔和尼采的批判还有一个强有力的答复。他可能会主张，他的批评者拥有的是一种不合情理的反社会和反历史的个体性思想。他们假定，一个人的个体性在某种程度上可以和社会与历史中的特殊位置分离开来；但是他可以论证说，这样一种观念是依照虚假的抽象，因为个人的身份最终依赖于他在社会和历史中的位置。如果我们试图把个体从这种位置中抽离出来，那么我们得到的就不是一个人，而只是纯粹的密码。此外，就一个个体是一个个体而言，根本就不存在仅对他有效的一套永恒的问题和关切；因为这些问题和关切完全依赖于个体的社会和政治语境。令人触目惊心的是，当克尔凯郭尔列举了应该关系到每一个具体生存着的个体的问题时，这些问题证明是受到历史和文化调节的。“成为不朽是什么意思？”“感恩上帝是什么意思？”这样的问题只是令那些相信基督教的拯救学说的人感兴趣——黑格尔质疑这种学说，并把它放进衰落时期的罗马文化之中。那么，黑格尔可能向克尔凯郭尔和尼采提出一种困境：似乎是，我们把个体变得愈加具体，它越会转变成一个社会的和历史的动物；我们越是讨论个体本身，个体也就越会变成一个纯粹的抽象。
Arguably, the existentialist tradition never really freed itself from the ethic of salvation, which Hegel had subjected to such severe criticism. Both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, for example, saw the highest good as a form of personal redemption, as an ideal to be achieved by the individual alone apart from the community. In Hegel’s view, such a conception of the highest good was only the result of social and political breakdown, and it arose from the false abstraction of a human being from its concrete context in society and history. No doubt, against his later critics Hegel would have cited Aristotle’s famous remark: ‘Apart from the polis, man is either a beast or god.’ It was no accident that Zarathustra’s sole companions were a serpent and an eagle.
可以论证的是，存在主义的传统从来没有把自己从拯救的伦理学中解放出来，而黑格尔已经对这种伦理学提出了如此严厉的批评。例如，克尔凯郭尔和尼采他们俩把至善看作是个人得救的形式，看作是只要通过在共同体之外的个体就可以获得的理想。在黑格尔的眼中，这样一种至善的观念不过是社会和政治崩溃的结果，而且它生自于一个人从他在社会和历史的具体语境中虚假的撤离。毫无疑问，黑格尔似乎已经援引亚里士多德的著名评论来反对他后来的批判者：“离了城邦，人非神即兽。”陪伴琐罗亚斯德的只有一鹰一蛇，这绝非偶然。
